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T he f inancia l  and economic cr is is  of  2008 had mult ip le 
consequences in Latin American and Caribbean countries. It disrupted 
economic performance and called into question the paradigms that had 
steered economic policy in most countries; and it also exacerbated 
the growing divergences in points of view that were emerging before 
the crisis, some of which are ideological, while others reflect different 
approaches to economic strategies. The differentiating factors include: 
the role of the State and its relation to the market; and the nature and 
scope of participation in the global economy. This article addresses some 
of these divergences, the tensions they generate, and what the future 
holds for cooperation within Latin America. It also points out that in this 
new scenario, characterized by some perplexity, issues inherent to the 
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Without doubt, the financial and economic crisis of 2008, 
preceded by the twin crisis that affected the energy and 
fuel markets, will be remembered as a watershed event, 
because it revealed the vulnerabilities of globalization, 
pushed the global economy to the brink, inflicted major 
hardship on tens of millions of human beings and 
also exacerbated old disputes and tensions over how 
to approach development. The crisis has spawned an 
abundant literature in academic circles, international 
organizations and even in the media. In ECLAC itself, 
valuable work has been done in analysing the origin 
of the crisis, along with its propagation, impact and 
potential consequences for the future (ECLAC, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c and 2009d). Perhaps less studied have 
been the disputes and tensions that that crisis intensified 
in the economic domain; and these in particular 
will form the central focus of this article from the 
Latin American standpoint. In general, the debate 
revolves around the role of the State in the various 
development paradigms; more specifically, two areas 
will be highlighted: how to address social equity and 





The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 not only 
changed the performance of the region’s economies, 
but tested economic policy paradigms that had been in 
place for a long time, albeit with contents and intensities 
that differed from one country to another. Thus, by 
having differentiated repercussions on different groups 
within each country, and also between countries, the 
crisis generated or exacerbated pre-existing tensions, 
influencing —among other things— the content, 
scope and tone of  international relations. Above 
all, differentiated responses intensified the debate on 
how to overcome the current predicament and be in a 
position to fulfil the universal aspirations so eloquently 
expressed in the Millennium Development Goals. 
From that standpoint, many analysts have noted, 
not without a certain perverse satisfaction, that 
following decades of listening to “sermons” from the 
world’s main economic centres, including multilateral 
financial institutions, on how to responsibly and 
consistently conduct macroeconomic management 
to avoid the periodic crises that characterized the 
region, this time the scenario was inverted and the 
former preachers were shown to be irresponsible. 
Meanwhile, their former Latin American pupils, who 
in general acted professionally, were those who had 
to pay for the havoc caused by a crisis that developed 
in the very heart of capitalism, without bearing the 
least responsibility for creating it. For a region that 
has often concealed its economic mismanagement by 
blaming its unsatisfactory performance on international 
phenomena, the “blame” on this occasion undeniably 
could be assigned abroad. 
In the light of  the crisis, many analysts, both 
individual and institutional, including the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) itself, have felt vindicated in their analysis 
of recent years. Firstly, they have persistently warned 
about the unsustainability of the financial imbalances 
that were developing in the world economy, especially 
between the United States and some of its surplus 
trading partners.1 Secondly, they have questioned the 
economic paradigm that has been in vogue since the 
1980s, specifically because of its overvaluation of the 
role of the market and its undervaluation of the role 
of  the State in economic and social performance. 
Over the last 20 years, ECLAC has contributed to 
the debate on development paradigms, strengthening 
its vocation as an organization that generates heterodox 
positions, questioning or supporting the postulates 
1 See, among others, ECLAC (2006a, p.31; 2007a, pp.35 and 36; 
and 2007b, p.24).
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of various orthodoxies, and addressing the specifics 
and characteristic features of development patterns in 
the region and its various types of economies.2 This 
vocation has been particularly relevant since 1990 
in the economic debate on current models, and the 
critique made by various sectors on the mechanical 
way in which its precepts were being applied.3 In its 
most simple terms, a central thrust of the analysis 
revolves around the idea that market signals alone 
would not resolve everything; what was required 
was a judicious combination of market and State
2 See ECLAC (1990, 1994a, 1996 and 1998) and Torres (2006).
3 For a penetrating analysis of the differences between the paradigm 
that was current in the 1990s and that proposed by ECLAC, see 
the interview of Fernando Fajnzylber by Fernando Fernández 
(Fernández, 1994, pp. 207-209).
to achieve the multiple objectives of development, 
including economic growth, greater equity, financial 
stability and environmental sustainability. 
The trigger for the great financial crisis of 
2008, which can largely be blamed on a market that 
functioned deficiently (to say the least) and the virtual 
absence of the State in fulfilling its regulatory role, will 
clearly encourage the agnostics of pure orthodoxy to 
persist in seeking devices to enable them to promote 
development in an increasingly complex and agitated 
international setting. 
III
Tensions and polarization of positions
entitled “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas 
(ALBA)”, signed between Cuba and the Bolivarian 
Republic of  Venezuela in December 2004, was 
initially proposed as an alternative to the Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), which, following 
the First Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in 
December 1994, aimed to create a hemisphere-wide 
free-trade zone (although specifically excluding Cuba 
for well-known reasons). 
As is common knowledge, the latter initiative 
never materialized, owing to resistance by several 
of the region’s countries, each motivated by its own 
reasons and interests. But the failure of the original 
initiative gave rise to a set of free trade agreements 
of limited geographic scope, which were added to 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
signed earlier between Mexico, Canada and the 
United States. Agreements of  this type have been 
implemented in Chile, the Central American countries, 
the Dominican Republic and Peru, with Colombia 
and Panama still waiting to join them. The dividing 
line between countries that maintain free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with the United States and those 
that propose an alternative, gained an additional 
ideological and political dimension in the way the 
different countries interacted with United States, 
which the Internet portal of  ALBA itself  describes 
—not without an offensive bias— as “an imperialist 
proposal for domination confronted by a patriotic 
proposal of liberalization” (Rossi, 2009). 
Some analysts have also added a geographic 
dimension to this sharp economic, political and 
ideological division. Firstly they point out that Latin 
The panorama becomes even more complicated, 
however, when one takes account of the increasing 
heterogeneity of  approaches emerging in Latin 
America, not only on how to address economic 
strategies and policies, but on how to visualize 
the role of  the region in the international setting, 
compounded by differences in political agenda that 
reflect the highly diverse situations prevailing in the 
different countries. The main dividing line in the 
economic debate precedes the 2008 crisis and stems 
from the way the different countries seek to interact 
with the international economy. In schematic terms 
(reality is always more complex and nuanced), the two 
extremes in a wide spectrum of positions would be as 
follows: at one end are countries that are intensively 
committed to openness and trade liberalization (but 
not all of them accepted financial liberalization at 
the same time, as postulated by the paradigm then 
in vogue). These countries sought to gain access to 
the main developed markets, particularly the United 
States, through free trade agreements. By definition, 
these countries are willing to largely submit to the 
dictates of the market economy. 
At the other end of the spectrum are countries 
that seek greater autonomy —from the international 
economy and the United States in particular— and 
less dependence on market signals. Indeed, the then 
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American countries in the Pacific Rim are well disposed 
towards openness and are increasingly engaged in 
the global economy. Secondly, those located on the 
Atlantic —including the original members of  the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), midway 
between ALBA countries and those that maintain FTAs 
with United States— are somewhat less enthusiastic 
about openness, although each for different reasons. 
In this scheme, Brazil would be seen a unique case, 
given its growing leadership and participation in the 
global economy, and the size of his domestic market 
(ECLAC, 2006b, p. 86).
Before going any further, it is worth noting that 
the divisions described above are in no way rigid, since 
there is a vast web of communicating links between 
countries which transcend those divisions. These arise 
from trade and financial relations, shared interests, 
membership of different formal groupings such as 
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), 
the Rio Group, the Latin American System (SELA), 
the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and 
MERCOSUR plus its associate members. There is also 
one country, Nicaragua, which, through a remarkable 
juggling act, maintains an FTA with United States 
and is also a member of ALBA. In addition, all of 
the region’s countries cultivate bilateral relations with 
Cuba, the major absentee from inter-American forums 
thus far, but which remains a source of inspiration 
for many Latin American people, who, among other 
things, view its resistance to the “empire” as a symbol 
of great dignity.
Whatever the case may be, this growing division 
within Latin American and the Caribbean, which, 
as noted above, was already developing before 2008, 
was greatly aggravated by the crisis. Thus, the strong 
tone of  condemnation of  the “neoliberal model” 
which accompanied the ALBA discourse (today 
known as the “Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples 
of our America”) saw the crisis as the confirmation 
of its frequent predictions, thereby heralding little 
less than the demise of capitalism.4 That discourse 
certainly had some objective foundation. The crisis 
exposed the myth of the exaggerated expectations that 
the market contained its own mechanisms for self-
correction against speculation; and it revealed serious 
4  In the final communiqué issued by the Special Summit of ALBA, 
held in Cumaná, Venezuela, on 17 April 2009, the President 
declared: “Capitalism is killing humanity and the planet. What 
we are living through is a global economic crisis of a systemic and 
structural nature, not just one more cyclical crisis.” Later on, the 
text refers to the “decadence of capitalism.”
failings in regulation and supervision mechanisms in 
the leading industrialized countries, not to mention 
the virtual non-existence of regulatory bodies with 
an international remit. It also noted the huge risk 
involved in the excessive participation of flight capital 
in international financial flows. 
In addition, the fact that the crisis was born in the 
“empire” underlined, once again, in the view of the 
ALBA interlocutors, that this was the source of many of 
the evils afflicting the region. Consequently, it is hardly 
surprising that countries that already had serious doubts 
about the organization of the international economy 
before the crisis —including their explicit disagreement 
with the role of the Bretton Woods institutions— now 
reached the conclusion that all of  the failings seen 
in the workings of the market called for nothing less 
than a new model. This position contrasted with that 
of  countries that contented themselves simply with 
accommodating to the situation, even if  this meant 
substantial manoeuvering.
Furthermore, detractor countries believe the 
crisis provides them with additional vindication, 
noting that Latin American countries whose export 
sector is most dependent on the United States market 
are those that were dragged down most by the effects 
of recession in that economy. Although it is hard to 
establish relations of causality between the trend of the 
United States economy and that of various countries 
in the region, it is undeniable that the high degree 
of  economic interdependence between the United 
States and Mexico is one of the factors explaining the 
dramatic drop in the level of economic activity in the 
latter country in 2009, even though it showed signs of 
recovery in the final quarter (ECLAC, 2009e). 
That said, in the world of ideas, the crisis is seen 
as triggering renewed debate in the region on how to 
approach its development. That debate has features 
of  polarization that call to mind the discussion of 
the 1960s and 1970s, despite distances in time and 
considering the huge change of  context, on the 
virtues and disadvantages of  centrally managed 
economies compared to market economies, with 
“mixed economies” occupying the middle ground, each 
with its own peculiar nuances. In the globalization 
context, the extremes are, again in schematic terms, 
the ALBA agenda on the one hand, and countries 
that are determined to persevere with the strategy 
that has prevailed in recent times, without major 
adjustments, on the other. The other countries — for 
now the majority having never embraced the “pure” 
orthodoxy — occupy intermediate spaces in which 
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they propose to redefine the frontier between market 
and State, again with individual variants from one 
country to another. These countries continue to 
build on the considerable achievements of  recent 
years as a result of  their participation in the global 
economy, rejecting sudden and substantial course 
changes in their development strategies. In other 
words, the current panorama recalls an era that had 
seemed consigned to the past, in which “opening up” 
strategies confronted “inward-looking development”, 
or socialism versus capitalism, with reformists 
occupying the middle ground and attempting to 
exploit the virtues of  both schools of  thought while 
eliminating their inconvenient assumptions.
IV
Parameters of the debate
Nonetheless, the content and scope of the opposing 
strategies still remains unclear. The model that 
President Hugo Chávez calls “Twenty-first century 
Socialism” is better defined by what it is not than by 
what it actually proposes, by categorically rejecting the 
model it proclaims to be defunct (“neoliberalism”). 
In the group of countries that are willing to maintain 
the general course of recent policies, although there 
is greater clarity about the precise modalities of the 
liberalization model, the mutations to be incorporated 
into the model in the future to adapt it to new domestic 
and international circumstances arising from the 
crisis are not clear.
In terms of  what it actually proposes, the 
“Bolivarian Alternative” is more doctrinaire than 
the relative pragmatic liberalization model. In the 
economic domain, it proclaims solidarity over egotism 
or profit-seeking; it gives pride of  place to the State 
in preference to private activities; and it argues for 
inclusion, participation, egalitarianism and poverty 
reduction as non-renounceable values. In addition, 
this alternative is wary of  an open trade regime 
guided by market signals and aims to mitigate its 
effects through balanced trade —sometimes based 
on a managed trade model between ALBA members 
and between them and other countries that are not 
members of  the Alliance, which harks back to the 
Mutual Economic Assistance Council (MEAC) of old. 
It also values South-South co-operation, one of whose 
most eloquent specific expressions is the PETROCARIBE 
Energy Cooperation Agreement promoted by the 
Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
along with bilateral cooperation programmes that 
both Venezuela and Cuba provide to many countries, 
particularly in the health area.5
5 Thus far 18 countries are benefiting from the innovative 
PETROCARIBE Energy Cooperation Agreement. 
These general calls for change in both the 
development paradigm and the international economic 
order have not yet been articulated in a comprehensive, 
internally consistent programmatic proposal. In 
other words, the rhetoric does not yet translate into 
implementable proposals, as can be inferred from the 
following quote, which again emphasizes what it is 
not: “It is necessary to develop an alternative model 
to the capitalist system; a system of solidarity and 
complementarity rather than competition; a system 
that is in harmony with Mother Earth, rather than 
squandering natural resources; a system of cultural 
diversity rather than the crushing of cultures and the 
imposition of cultural values and lifestyles that are 
foreign to the realities of our countries; a system of 
peace based on social justice rather than imperialist 
policies and wars.”6 Clearly, the call to far-reaching 
transformation implicit in the foregoing, which 
encompasses doubtless praiseworthy objectives, also 
has a significant political and ideological underpinning, 
and is inspired in a nationalist current and calling for 
Latin American unity. 
At the same time, many of those calls to action, 
including those related to inclusion, participation and 
combating absolute and relative inequality, are common 
to the development strategies of countries that seek 
to improve their participation in the international 
economy; so the key element of  differentiation 
between the opposing economic-policy approaches 
concerns the secular debate on the role of the State 
and its relation to the market. This, of  course, is 
juxtaposed with more pronounced ideological or 
doctrinaire differences. 
In brief, the region is facing two quite conflicting 
approaches towards its future development, with a 
6 Extracted from the Final Declaration of the Special Summit of 
ALBA, held in Cumaná, Venezuela, on 17 April, 2009.
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wide range of intermediate variants. One end of the 
spectrum calls for a “fresh start” the precise outlines 
of which are hard to discern; in contrast, the other 
extreme accepts that the strategies used to engage 
in the international economy thus far are pointing 
in the right direction, although they need constant 
adjustment, particularly in the wake of the multiple 
crises of  2008. Any attempt to characterize the 
conflicting approaches is on slippery ground, not 
only for the reasons set out in the previous section, 
but also because each of the region’s countries has 
its own peculiarities in macroeconomic management 
and social policies, which reflect the prevailing reality 
and circumstances and also the ideological bias of 
the government in power. 
In any event, the 2008 crisis clearly marks the 
end of  a period in which the vast majority of  the 
region’s countries pursued mainstream economic 
strategies and policies, albeit with variants from one 
country to another. Some called those economic 
strategies and policies as “neoliberal”, others as 
the “Washington consensus”; and others still saw 
them as a national response to the challenges of 
globalization. Despite considerable nuances, the 
broad outlines of  economic policy in the vast 
majority of  countries were pointing more or less in 
the same direction. Clearly, the same could be said 
of  the 1950s and 1960s, when the ECLAC paradigm 
was what constituted the mainstream, and this was 
called into question by an orthodoxy that started 
to gain ascendancy in the 1970s, spawning a variety 
of  approaches, similar to the phenomenon being 
experienced today and which probably will accentuate 
in the immediate future (Fishlow, 1985).
V
Conﬂicting proposals on inequality 
One of the most persuasive critiques of the “neoliberal 
model” concerns its concentrating and excluding 
nature. The orthodox thesis whereby “the magic of the 
market” would ensure that the benefits of economic 
growth would “trickle down” in favour of low-income 
groups, has long been discredited. For that reason, 
over the decades ECLAC has been insisting on the 
importance of supplementing market signals with 
specific policies to make growth more equitable.7 The 
social deficits and inequity prevailing in Latin America 
are also the foundations most widely postulated by 
those who invoke “Twenty-first century socialism” to 
address the needs of lower-income groups, pointing 
to Cuba’s undeniable achievements in this area over 
several decades (ECLAC, 2000). 
It is hardly surprising that combating inequality 
attracts so much attention. As is well known, there 
is a huge range of literature on absolute and relative 
poverty in the region, as well as on the strategies 
for dealing with it and how to reconcile growth and 
equity objectives. The priority given to this aim does 
not answer to any specific ideology. Proposals for 
empowering the poor have even arisen with intellectual 
origins that can be found in ideas embraced by relatively 
7 See, for example, ECLAC (1994b).
more conservative groups in the Latin American 
ideological spectrum — such as placing trust in the 
functioning of the market, the fundamental role of 
the rule of law, and an environment that is friendly 
to small business development.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean is, on average, 
the most unequal of all of world’s developing regions 
(World Bank, 2005, pp.4-8 and 66; Lustig, 2009, p.1); 
and it is also true that, while economic growth tended 
to help reduce absolute poverty until the 1990s, in 
most cases income distribution (relative poverty) 
tended to stagnate or even worsen (ECLAC, 1997; La 
Fuente and Sáinz, 2001, pp.161-170). But the fact 
that this is precisely where changes have occurred in 
recent times makes a powerful call for reflection at 
the very least.
It is therefore important to recognize the significant 
progress made in many of  the region’s countries, 
which have pragmatically combined elements of the 
paradigm in use, particularly in terms of macroeconomic 
management and strengthening of the rule of law, with 
innovative policies to deal with the social backlogs 
8 See, for example, Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 
(2008). This commission was co-chaired by Madeleine Albright 
and Hernando de Soto.
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that constitute the main Achilles heel of the region’s 
economic performance. This judicious combination 
of market and State was starting to yield significant 
achievements in the region, particularly when comparing 
certain countries in 2008, for example, with their 
situation 10 years earlier. It could also be argued that 
some nations withstood the devastating effects of the 
financial and economic crisis with a greater capacity for 
resistance and greater strength than was envisaged just 
a few months earlier, at least to judge by performance 
forecast for 2010 (ECLAC, 2009e).
What is even more relevant for the purposes 
of this article, however, is that significant progress 
was made in tackling the social deficits. Thus, the 
incidence of  poverty in the region as a whole fell 
from around 44% to 33% in a decade —between the 
late 1990s and 2008— while the incidence of extreme 
poverty declined from 19% to 13% (ECLAC, 2009f, 
pp. 3-12). Equally or perhaps more significant is 
that for the first time widespread improvements are 
reported in the income distribution, which are partly 
attributable to the compensating effect of  public 
policy on the concentrating trend of growth in earlier 
periods.9 According to a recent ECLAC report, 15 of 
the 18 countries that have data available reported 
an improvement in the income distribution (ECLAC, 
2009f, pp. 12-17). 
According to that report, the progress achieved 
was due to the following factors among others: firstly, 
economic expansion combined with growing levels
9 See, for example, Soares and others (2009, pp. 207-224).
of job creation; secondly, a gradual but significant 
improvement in the financial capacity of States, which, 
among other progress, made it possible to achieve 
a sharp quantitative and also qualitative increase 
in social spending; thirdly, the application of quite 
creative distributive policies, such as monetary transfer 
programs and conditional transfers (Madariaga, 2009); 
and, fourthly, the favourable (and predictable) effects 
of  the demographic transition under way in most 
countries of  the region, which is producing lower 
indices of dependency per worker employed (ECLAC, 
2009f). Added to these factors are the cumulative 
effects of  increased social spending, particular on 
education, because the wage gap —which separates 
the best from the worst paid groups— seems to be 
narrowing in many countries, as a reflection of that 
phenomenon (López Calva and Lustig, 2009).
In brief, the development strategies adopted 
by countries of the region that chose the “openness 
model”, judiciously combining public intervention 
with market forces, seem to have produced equal or 
even more satisfactory results in combating poverty 
and improving the income distribution than those 
achieved by countries that have been critical of that 
strategy’s notoriously concentrating nature (Lustig and 
McLeod, 2009). At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that the impressive progress made in some 
countries has not been shared by all economies of 
the region; and capacity to withstand the effects of 




they generally argue in favour of correcting those 
failings through institutional reforms.10 In contrast, 
other countries in the region, led by members of 
ALBA, propose much more radical reforms and even 
the replacement of those institutions by something 
10 This statement can be confirmed by reviewing some of  the 
documents contained in the web portal of the Inter-governmental 
Group of Twenty Four (http://www.g24.org/).
The other subject on which positions within the region 
are polarized relates to the attitude of the different 
governments towards the institutional organization of 
the international economy. Although countries that 
chose the openness model have expressed serious doubts 
about the governance systems of existing mechanisms, 
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different, which they tend to characterize as more 
transparent and more democratic.11
The dividing line is not clear: all countries in the 
region denounce the current institutional order; and 
all of them blame the existing financial institutions, in 
particular the International Monetary Fund. They all 
also point to major failings in that international order 
which depend largely on a single reserve currency (the 
dollar) and lack many coordination mechanisms.12 
But the differentiation also has clear features. At one 
extreme are countries that essentially blame those 
institutions for “imposing” the model that led to ruin 
and want to suppress them, transferring their functions 
to other more democratic and universal institutions 
such as the United Nations. At the other extreme are 
countries that have raised a variety of questions about 
the working practices of those institutions and above 
all their governance system, but not to the extent of 
suggesting their elimination. Instead, those countries 
confine themselves to proposing changes, including 
major ones, in the governance system and in regulatory 
practices of those institutions, sometimes considering 
the creation of  new international mechanisms. 
For example, an idea that is attracting increasing 
attention is to create an international mechanism 
to act as a sort of economic governing council for 
all multilateral organizations in the economic and 
financial domain.13
As a parallel issue, one group of countries severely 
criticizes the emergence of the Group of 20 (G-20) as 
an extension of the system of domination and exclusion 
present in the current international financial order. 
Other countries in the region accept this informal forum 
—some of them reluctantly— as a step forward, in 
that it includes some increasingly protagonist emerging 
economies, and because it acted swiftly to promote 
a concerted, coordinated and timely response to the 
11 “We need to establish a new international economic order based 
on solidarity, justice, equity and sustainable development. The 
international financial architecture should be founded anew. The 
United Nations, particularly this General Assembly, is called to 
play a key role in this endeavor.” MenuAddress by the Minister of 
Foreign Relations of Cuba, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, in the general 
debate of the 64th session of the General Assembly, 28 September, 
2009 (http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/CU.shtml).
12  José Antonio Ocampo has written an excellent essay on this 
topic, entitled “Rethinking Global Economic and Social Governance” 
(Ocampo, 2009).
13 See, for example, United Nations (2009). This commission, 
chaired by Professor Joseph Stiglitz, among many other things 
recommended setting up what he calls a “Global Economic 
Coordination Council, (United Nations 2009, pp. 90-97).
crisis.14 Moreover, some see this incipient forum as the 
embryo of a future mechanism such as the economic 
council described in the foregoing paragraph. Here 
again, the positions adopted by Latin American and 
the Caribbean countries to this international dimension 
of the crisis are highly divergent. 
All of  these divergences came to the fore 
during the design, preparation and holding of the 
United Nations Conference at the Highest Level on 
the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its 
Impact on Development. The mere decision to hold 
this event was overshadowed by intense controversy 
between countries that wanted to restore to the United 
Nations its governing role over international financial 
and economic organization and those who insisted 
that that role corresponded to the Bretton Woods 
institutions and their inter-governmental mechanisms. 
Underlying the controversy is the increasingly obvious 
obsolescence of the governance system of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, particularly in relation to voting 
weights among their boards of executive directors. In 
addition, the actual policies of the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and what now is the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) were also increasingly 
called into question. Clearly, the United Nations is not 
immune from that critique, where there are insistent 
calls for reform of the Security Council. 
The developed countries, led in this case by the 
United States delegation (in the final months of the 
Bush administration), ferociously resisted the holding 
of such a conference. The opposition, in which Cuba, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Nicaragua, 
among others, played a proactive role, were equally 
insistent in favour of it. In the end a compromise 
was reached at the International Conference on 
Financing for Development, held in Qatar, Doha, in 
December 2008, which announced that “the United 
Nations will hold a conference at the highest level 
on the world financial and economic crisis and its 
effects on development”. The latter wording was 
crucial, because countries that denied a role for the 
United Nations on financial issues did not question 
its role in promoting development (United Nations, 
2008, paragraph 79). 
The preparation of the conference was a highly 
problematic process, especially because it was placed 
14  For the report issued by the latest G-20 meeting held in Pittsburgh, 
United States, on 24 and 25 September 2009, see: https://www.
pittsburghg20.org/PDFs/G20Report1109.pdf.
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under the aegis of  the President of  the General 
Assembly, held at that time by Father Miguel D’Escoto 
of Nicaragua, who used his position to influence the 
content of the declaration that would emanate from 
the General Assembly. The conflicts that soon arose 
around the final product of the conference were not 
of the traditional North-South type, but also occurred 
within the Group of 77 plus China, and among Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. It is beyond the 
scope of this article to provide a detailed description 
of this, but reader should refer to the text of the draft 
proposal of the policy declaration that the President 
of the General Assembly submitted to members on 
8 May 2009, replacing the “softer” version prepared 
by the two facilitators he had previously assigned to 
this task (the Ambassadors of the Netherlands and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines).15 
That draft declaration projected the conference 
as an event comparable to the historic Bretton Woods 
Conference of 1944, and it aimed to place the new 
financial and monetary order under the universal forum 
of the United Nations (the “G-192”), in a conceptual 
and ideological context that did not specifically reflect 
the viewpoint of the world’s leading economic powers, 
and not even that of  many developing countries. 
There was a rebellion against the text, the President 
had to retract, and ultimately the conference was held 
without major upheavals, resulting in a declaration 
that was diplomatically acceptable to all parties, but 
irrelevant for future action.16
The main point is that the increasing differentiation 
of approaches on how best to address development 
has also been transmitted to the positions adopted by 
the region’s countries on economic issues in the main 
international forums. It remains to be seen whether this 
new differentiation is healthy for the United Nations. 
For the moment, it has revived issues that were being 
debated 35 years ago in the framework of “a new 
international economic order”, with a strong tone 
of denunciation by countries of the “South” against 
countries of the “North”, and demands to level the 
playing field of the international economy to give 
similar opportunities to all countries to participate 
in its benefits.17 
16 General Assembly Resolution 63/303, on the “Outcome of 
Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its 
Effects on Development”. The potentially most significant outcome 
to emerge from the conference was perhaps the establishment of 
an ad hoc open-ended working group to follow up on the issues 
contained in the final document (see Resolution 63/305).
17 Resolution 63/224 of  19 December 2008, “Towards a New 
International Economic Order”.





In conclusion, the 2008 crisis not only had far-reaching 
repercussions on economies and financing, but also 
on ideas. The questioning of the paradigm that had 
been predominant for some two decades, which 
had gained a growing number of  supporters, was 
intensified as a consequence of the crisis. The many 
consequences that can be expected for the years to 
come include the following:
Firstly, it would seem that a period that allowed 
for a high level of consensus around an economic 
paradigm, at least in its broad execution outlines, 
has given way to a period of doubts, questionings, 
and testing of alternatives. 
Secondly, there will consequently be a more 
intensive debate on development strategies and 
policies, motivated by the reversal that the crisis 
has inflicted on many countries. That debate will 
be healthy provided it does not lead to unnecessary 
confrontations between countries or between different 
groups in any given country. 
Thirdly, and as a corollary, new areas are opening 
up for the work of  ECLAC, whose Secretariat can 
contribute to the debate with its own initiatives and as 
a vehicle for exchange of opinion and experiences. 
Fourthly, at the same time the emergence of 
the “Bolivarian Alternative”, which invokes Latin 
American and Caribbean unity, paradoxically 
could foster division rather than rapprochement, by 
introducing diverging factors within country groupings 
that have historically been united around common 
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values and interests. It is notable that the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the peoples of  our America has now 
grown sufficiently to participate in each of the formal 
integration processes that are currently ongoing: 
in Central America (Nicaragua), the Caribbean 
Community (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines), and in MERCOSUR 
(should membership by the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela be ratified). Of course, that scenario will 
not necessarily be reflected in daily practice, but it 
does constitute a new reality of differentiation that 
did not exist before. This in turn is bound to fuel 
sharper disputes and tensions than those that seen, 
for example, in the 1990s.
Fifthly, with the increasing differentiation 
of positions, a new bias of confrontation is being 
introduced in multilateral forums normally characterized 
by cooperation. This has made it increasingly difficult 
to reach universal agreements, as shown by the 
experience of  the High-Level Conference on the 
World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Effects 
on Development in July 2009, and again at the United 
Nations Conference on Climate Change, where the 
relatively meagre results —even then rejected by ALBA 
countries— were being announced just as this article 
was being completed.18
Lastly, as in previous transition periods, it is likely 
that we are again entering a period of perplexity, in 
contrast to the relative security that characterized 
the actions of policymakers in the years leading up 
to 2008. This will be another of the legacies of the 
2008 crisis. 
18 See the Special Communiqué on Climate Change of the VIII 
ALBA Summit, with a view to the XV Conference of Parties in 
Copenhagen, on 14 December 2009, and the intervention by the 
President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez 
Frías, at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change 
in Copenhagen, Denmark, on 16 December 2009. http://www.
alternativabolivariana.org/.
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